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PRETRIAL PROCEDURES FOR INNOCENT PEOPLE: REFORMING BRADY
I. INTRODUCTION
 This symposium,1 Exonerating the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures, presents 
an unusual and fascinating opportunity. The organizers of the symposium have 
proposed that the current adjudication process be scrapped for a defendant who certifies 
his innocence and waives all constitutional rights.2 For those of us who find that 
proposal troubling, the symposium challenges us to ask what pretrial changes could be 
made, short of an entirely new adjudication track, to protect the innocent defendant.
 My choice is the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to 
the defense. In 1963, in what was intended to be a landmark decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that the prosecution has a due process 
obligation to provide favorable evidence to the defense when that evidence is material 
to guilt or punishment.3 Over the ensuing forty-five years, it has become clear that 
this constitutional doctrine is inadequate to protect the integrity of the criminal 
process and certainly has failed to protect the innocent.4 These failures result from 
f laws in the Brady doctrine itself: its reliance on an outcome-determinative 
“materiality” standard, its abject inability to ensure that investigating agencies 
disclose exculpatory information to prosecutors, and its lack of any meaningful time 
requirements. In the absence of meaningful judicial guidance, many states have 
enacted statutes addressing a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory 
information;5 most federal jurisdictions have created similar court rules.6 Congress 
also has enacted Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 16).7 The 
language and content of all of these provisions, however, are extremely general, and 
it has been almost universally acknowledged that these requirements have not resulted 
in sufficient disclosure by prosecutors.8
 At the same time, in the more than two decades since DNA testing revolutionized 
our understanding of wrongful convictions, we have learned much about what causes 
wrongful convictions in the first place.9 This knowledge has led to changes in 
investigative techniques, such as recording confessions and using more reliable 
1. Symposium, Exonerating the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 825 (2011–
12).
2. See Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 547 (2008); Lewis M. Steel, Op-Ed., Building a Justice System, News & 
Observer (Raleigh), Jan. 10, 2003, at A17.
3. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Many excellent scholars have addressed the inadequacies of Brady. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch 
of Flaws, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1533 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 
47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685 (2006).
5. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 69.
7. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; see infra note 115 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Medwed, supra note 4; Gershman, supra note 4.
9. For an example of an article discussing the causes of wrongful conviction, see Samuel R. Gross et al., 
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 542–45 (2005).
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identification procedures.10 Curiously, however, as the organizers of this symposium 
astutely recognized, this knowledge has not yet resulted in reforms of the pretrial 
adjudicatory process. We persist in ignoring what we already know. This is most 
obvious in our failure to reform pretrial prosecutorial disclosure obligations.
 For example, we know that the nondisclosure of exculpatory information is a 
major cause of wrongful convictions.11 We know that particular aspects of the 
constitutional doctrine have caused this, especially the imposition of the outcome-
determinative test of materiality on a prosecutor’s decision whether to disclose.12 We 
also know the precise kinds of suppressed information that result in wrongful 
convictions, such as prior identifications by witnesses,13 tips relating to other 
suspects,14 or leniency deals with witnesses.15 We know that, although the Supreme 
Court has held prosecutors responsible for the consequences of suppression of 
exculpatory evidence by investigatory agencies,16 there is yet no reliable mechanism 
for prosecutors eager to comply with this requirement to compel or even monitor 
such disclosure.17 Finally, we know that the U.S. public has less confidence in the 
criminal justice system than in other parts of government.18 Nothing is more 
destructive of confidence in the system than the discovery, after a wrongful conviction, 
that evidence of the defendant’s innocence—or of someone else’s guilt—was actually 
10. See False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of Interrogations, Innocence Project, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Eyewitness Identification, 
Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2011).
11. Government Misconduct, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Goverment-Misconduct.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); see also James S. Liebman et al., Capital 
Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839 (2000).
12. See discussion infra notes 43–59 and accompanying text.
13. See Government Misconduct, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Government-Misconduct.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
14. Id.
15. See, for example, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), discussed infra note 48 and accompanying 
text.
16. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (noting that a “prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”).
17. New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 
31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 2023 (2010) [hereinafter Report of the Working Group on Best Practices] 
(“Prosecutors are charged with effectuating disclosure obligations, and are hampered in doing so in a 
complete and timely manner if they do not receive evidence and information that is gathered by and 
known to police investigators. Hence, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement, and 
the procedures for ensuring information f low between those actors, are central to the discovery practices 
of a prosecutor’s office.” (footnote omitted)).
18. The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, State University of New York at 
Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 112 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire 
eds., 31st ed. 2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/toc_2.html (using the statistics in 
Table 2.10 to show Americans have less confidence in the criminal justice system than in the banking, 
medical, public school, or television news).
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in the hands of the prosecution or the police. No theory of fairness and efficiency can 
possibly justify this result.
 Like Professor Robinson, therefore,19 I am concerned about the moral 
accountability of the adjudicative process. Our process has not kept up with our 
knowledge about wrongful convictions. There is something horrible when the system 
not only convicts the wrong person but had the information it needed to get the right 
person. Like Professor Liebman,20 I am concerned that exonerations of innocent, 
convicted individuals often reveal circumstantial evidence of the identity of the 
perpetrator—evidence that was available to police from the beginning and did not 
match the innocent defendant, but turns out to match the actual perpetrator.21 
Finally, like the Risingers,22 I am concerned about the limited amount of information 
that ever enters the adjudication process pretrial and join their effort to make the 
investigative process more neutral as a way to yield more information that can be 
subject to adversarial testing.
 But I also uniquely view this issue from a comparative perspective. Many of my 
proposals here are based on the discovery process in the United Kingdom, which, 
although not perfect, formalizes the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose favorable 
information and neutralizes the partisan investigation of a criminal case, which results 
in feeding more information into the adversarial process. Such a system can serve to 
substantially help the innocent. In addition, the awareness that we stand alone 
internationally in the narrow view of fairness (or the naively expansive view of the 
adversary system) with respect to our limited disclosure rules informs my views here.23
 There is a better way. In this article, I propose that the prosecution’s obligation to 
disclose exculpatory information to the defense be formalized by statute, court rule, 
or internal protocol in ways that would reflect the current state of our knowledge of 
and experience with both Brady and wrongful convictions. This would improve on 
the current ineffective constitutional protection—and any existing statutory or rule-
based regimes—in several ways. First, such a formalized regime would require 
disclosure of all materials that are reasonably helpful to the defense. Second, unlike 
the constitutional doctrine, which provides no reliable mechanism for monitoring 
police disclosure to the prosecution, an accompanying schedule (or “checklist”) would 
require specific categories of exculpatory information that the prosecution would 
have to secure from the police or other investigative agency and then disclose to the 
19. Paul Robinson, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School Exonerating 
the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures Symposium (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://nyls.
mediasite.com/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=e599c53a63144b1d837d50148d48a5c41d.
20. James S. Liebman, Professor, Columbia Law Sch., Remarks at the New York Law School Exonerating 
the Innocent: Pre-Trial Innocence Procedures Symposium (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://nyls.
mediasite.com/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=18566e942c2248bab5097658c953b13e1d.
21. Id.
22. D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in 
Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 869, 886–90 (2011–12).
23. Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New Reflections on White Queens, 
Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 211, 217, 274–75 (2005).
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defense. Third, the prosecution would be required to certify that it has used due 
diligence to collect and disclose all of the required information. Fourth, unlike the 
constitutional Brady rule, which requires the defendant to show materiality whenever 
suppressed evidence is discovered post-conviction, if suppression of evidence required 
on the checklist is discovered post-conviction, the burden of proof would shift and 
the prosecution would be required to prove that the suppression was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. As to any other information, the defendant would continue to 
bear the burden of showing materiality. Finally, there would be a public interest 
declination exception and a process for the prosecution to apply for a protective order 
where necessary to protect a witness or another investigation.
 Several doctrinal strands and recent developments come together to support the 
creation of this new disclosure scheme. First, in several other jurisprudential contexts, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the investigative stage of a criminal case is 
not as adversarial as the trial stage. Thus, for example, the police enjoy only qualified 
immunity for misconduct during an investigation,24 and, of course, there is no Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel until formal proceedings have begun because the 
adversarial process has not yet commenced.25 Requiring a less adversarial, more 
collaborative disclosure process would be consistent with this treatment of the 
24. In several areas, the Court has recognized that the investigative stage of a case is different—and less 
adversarial—than the adjudicative stage. This doctrine supports a less adversarial disclosure regime. 
First, the Court has distinguished the investigatory stage from the adversarial stage in the area of 
prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court held that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute 
immunity from a civil suit for damages arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for knowingly presenting 
perjured testimony. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court explained that such immunity is quasi-judicial and 
is based on the need to protect the judicial process. Id. at 424–27. However, the Court has not applied 
that immunity to investigative actions. Police and other executive branch officials are only entitled to 
qualified immunity based on misconduct during the investigatory stage of a case.
Significantly, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, 
would have held that only qualified immunity applies where information relevant to the defense is 
“unconstitutionally withheld . . . from the court.” Id. at 433–34, 443 (White, J., concurring). That is, to 
the extent that absolute immunity is designed to protect the judicial process by ensuring that all relevant 
information is brought to the attention of the court, “[i]t would stand [this purpose] . . . on its head . . . 
to apply it to a suit based on a claim that the prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld information from 
the court.” Id. at 442–43. Indeed, recognizing only a qualified immunity might result in disclosure of 
more evidence, but “this will hardly injure the judicial process.” Id. at 443. Lower courts have held that 
suppression of exculpatory evidence is “beyond the scope of ‘duties constituting an integral part of the 
judicial process’” and have accordingly refused to extend absolute immunity to those actions. Hilliard v. 
Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1218 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Haaf v. Grams, 355 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D. Minn. 
1973). Moreover, as Justice White recognized, unlike acts committed in the courtroom as part of the 
presentation of a case, for which the judicial process has the remedy of reversal, “the judicial process has 
no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of suppressing evidence” of which it usually will 
be ignorant. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443–44 (White, J., concurring). Accordingly, it is important to use only 
qualified immunity to deter such violations when they do surface.
25. The Court has long recognized that the investigatory stage is not part of the adversary process by its 
decision that no right to counsel exists before the judicial process has begun until the filing of formal 
charges has occurred. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972) (noting that prior cases in which the Court found the right to counsel attached all 
involved “points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by 
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”).
974
PRETRIAL PROCEDURES FOR INNOCENT PEOPLE: REFORMING BRADY
investigative stage.26 Second, the Supreme Court has required that prosecutors ensure 
that exculpatory evidence in the hands of the police is turned over and has assumed 
prosecutors have the mechanisms to do so.27 Yet Brady and its progeny offer no 
method to accomplish this and naively ignore the realities that interfere with 
enforcement of disclosure by investigative agencies.28 Third, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly recognized that the suppression of requested, potentially exculpatory 
evidence generally is prejudicial.29 That presumption should apply here to create a 
presumption of prejudice where requested or itemized exculpatory information is 
suppressed. Fourth, several high-profile criminal cases have revealed substantial and 
systemic suppression of exculpatory evidence and have focused judicial and public 
attention on the problem.30 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized, in other 
contexts, that the United States is part of an international community.31 The fact 
that prosecutorial disclosure is more limited in the United States than in most other 
criminal justice systems, and imposes “fewer demands for transparency and fair play 
than in almost any other mature legal system” in the world,32 reinforces the notion 
that the time has come when we should abandon that dubious distinction.
 A second development is ref lected in recent scholarly and professional reform 
efforts that have focused on changing and formalizing the prosecutor’s Brady 
obligations. Recent proposals, like the one presented here, would, among other 
things, reform Brady by formalizing it in court rules and checklists that would make 
the prosecutor’s obligations clearer, more transparent, and more realistic, and, 
therefore, easier to implement and enforce.
 Ultimately, Brady’s naive but necessary underlying assumption that prosecutors 
and their investigators will be able to wear two hats has been demonstrably disproved 
not only by experience but also by social science. Clear rules and expectations are 
required. Recent proposals suggest that this is the required reform; several states and 
26. For a fascinating and thorough discussion about the non-adversarial pre-charge role of the prosecutor, 
see Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial 
Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923 (1996). 
27. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (“[N]o one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to 
inform a prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt that ‘procedures and 
regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all 
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972))).
28. Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17.
29. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“When the prosecutor receives a specific and 
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. W.R. Grace, 429 
F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2006).
31. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (observing that in the Eighth Amendment context, “[t]he 
judgments of other nations and the international community are not dispositive . . . . But ‘the climate of 
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment’ is also ‘not irrelevant.’” 
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n. 22 (1982))).
32. Cerruti, supra note 23, at 212.
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district courts have already moved in this direction, and it closely resembles the 
process currently employed in the United Kingdom. We should have clear disclosure 
rules that ensure greater fairness and reliability of the criminal process.
 Part II of this article sets forth the reasons to reform and formalize Brady, including 
the inadequacies of the current Constitutional, aspects of the common law regime, and 
recent scholarly and professional reform efforts. Part III analyzes the United Kingdom’s 
statutory disclosure process, on which several of my suggested reforms are based. Part 
IV suggests a model for a formalized Brady disclosure regime. Appendices A, B, and 
C to this article offer model checklists and disclosure provisions forming the basis 
for thier reformed Brady regime.
II. REASONS TO REFORM BRADY
 A. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Brady Doctrine
 Much has been written about the lost promise of Brady and its failure to protect 
a defendant’s right to fundamental fairness.33 There is no reason to restate what has 
been so clearly and effectively documented and analyzed elsewhere. Brady promised 
to make the adversary system “less like a sporting event and more like a search for 
truth.”34 Theoretically, exculpatory evidence that might never have surfaced would 
now be revealed and subjected to adversarial testing as part of a fair search for truth. 
The prosecutor’s superior investigatory resources would now be used to level the 
playing field in the criminal process. Many have concluded, however, as the courts 
developed and refined the Brady doctrine, the protections afforded have been easily 
and frequently evaded.35
 The failings of Brady may be due, in part, to its uniqueness. It was and still is the 
only rule of U.S. criminal procedure that imposes an affirmative duty of fairness on 
the prosecutor.36 In addition, it was and still is the only area of constitutional criminal 
procedure in which the fairness of a prosecutor’s pretrial decision is governed by an 
outcome-determinative standard—a standard that uniquely (1) puts the burden on 
the defendant to show that (2) the prosecutor’s pretrial decision was unfair in light of 
what occurred at a subsequent trial.37 Moreover, the defendant’s burden of proof is 
33. See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1536–44; Gershman, supra note 4, at 685–89. For a recent and thorough 
discussion of a specific case involving a massive failure to disclose, see Beth Brennan & Andrew King-
Ries, A Fall From Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20 
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 313 (2010). 
34. Gershman, supra note 4, at 708 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event 
or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 8 (1990)); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The 
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 Wash. U. L.Q. 279.
35. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. 
Rev. 275, 278, 285 (2004) (analyzing the results of U.S. wrongful conviction studies); Gershman, supra 
note 4, at 687–89; Gross et al., supra note 9, at 542; Liebman et al., supra note 11, at 1849 (stating that 
prosecutorial or police suppression of evidence that the defendant is innocent or does not deserve the 
death penalty accounted for nineteen percent of reversals in capital cases).
36. See Gershman, supra note 4, at 685–89.
37. See discussion infra notes 45–59 and accompanying text.
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uniquely high: no Brady violation is established absent a “reasonable probability” that 
the jury’s verdict would have been different had the information been disclosed.38 
Further, Brady necessarily rests on a remarkable—and perhaps blind—faith in the 
capacity of prosecutors, who are advocates, to subordinate their values, cognitive 
biases, and competitive instincts to undertake the role of “minister of justice.”39 In a 
truly schizophrenic role,40 prosecutors must sift through their own evidence for 
weaknesses, identify whether those weaknesses are serious, and nevertheless continue 
the prosecution regardless. In addition, by imputing police nondisclosure to the 
prosecution, Brady assumes, again, perhaps blindly, that there are procedures by 
which prosecutors can ensure the police disclose exculpatory information to them.41 
Yet there are none, and Brady provides the prosecutors with neither a carrot nor a 
stick to do so.42 Finally, unlike other prosecutorial misconduct, a failure to disclose, 
as well as the information suppressed, remains hidden from judicial review both 
when it occurs and forever after, absent some serendipitous discovery by an already 
convicted—at that point probably unrepresented—defendant.43
 Scholarly opinion seems to agree that Brady has floundered on the shoals of the 
materiality requirement. When it was decided, Brady’s directive to disclose favorable 
evidence that was material to guilt or punishment promised disclosure of a wide range 
of favorable evidence that would be considered material.44 Thus, while Brady originally 
38. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”).
39. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. (2011); Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception 
to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations, Amicus: Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 6–7 (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Gershman_Publish.pdf (“The prosecutor is at once 
encouraged to be a zealous advocate charged with the responsibility of winning convictions against 
people who break the law, but at the same time is encouraged to be a neutral minister of justice with the 
duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence that might assist the defendant in obtaining an 
acquittal. . . . Brady exemplifies a remarkable faith of the Supreme Court in the capacity of prosecutors 
to subordinate their moral values, personal biases, and competitive instincts to the overriding objective 
of the pursuit of truth in the service of justice.”); see also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The 
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291.
40. See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 Ind. L.J. 481, 486–98 (2009) (describing the 
prosecutor’s dual role as advocate and minister of justice in the Brady context).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 50–54.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 85–92.
43. See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 531, 537 (2007) (listing various ways previously suppressed evidence may be discovered, including 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, investigation by defendants and their families, discovery 
in related cases, or simply by chance). 
44. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Court suggested that its decision was merely an 
extension of earlier decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, such as Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), where the Court reversed a conviction based on knowing submission of 
perjured testimony. The unifying theme of these cases is the recognition by the Court of the central role 
played by the prosecutor in ensuring that an accused receives a fair trial. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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indicated that the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose “favorable” evidence,45 the 
obligation is really to disclose only material “favorable” evidence, a much narrower 
category of disclosure. While the Court’s original decision might have suggested that a 
wide range of favorable evidence would be considered material, its subsequent treatment 
of that issue makes clear that the definition of materiality is extremely narrow. In 
United States v. Agurs,46 a homicide case in which the defendant claimed self-defense, 
the defendant had not requested, and the government had not disclosed, clearly 
exculpatory evidence that would have shown that the deceased had a history of 
violence.47 The Court prescribed two different materiality tests, depending on whether 
the defendant had requested the suppressed information, and found that the suppressed 
evidence of the deceased’s violent history, which was not requested by the defense, was 
not material. Later, in United States v. Bagley,48 the Court explicitly held that 
“exculpatory evidence” includes impeachment evidence. In that case, the defense had 
requested, but the prosecution had failed to disclose, prior agreements with government 
witnesses by which they would be paid if the defendants were convicted. The Court 
also revisited the issue of materiality in the request-no-request dichotomy and adopted 
a unitary standard of materiality for all situations. Under this standard, evidence is 
material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”49
 Later, in Kyles v. Whitley,50 the Court explained that the materiality standard 
does not require a defendant to prove that disclosure of the suppressed material would 
have resulted in his acquittal. Instead, it requires a defendant to show that suppression 
of the evidence caused him to not receive a fair trial, meaning that the trial did not 
“result[] in a verdict worthy of confidence.”51
 The Kyles decision is also important because it revealed another serious fault in 
the Brady doctrine: the Court made clear that when exculpatory information is 
withheld by the police, nondisclosure is imputed to the prosecutor even if he does not 
know anything about it. The Kyles court based that conclusion on the assumption 
45. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .”).
46. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
47. Id. at 100–01. Justice Stevens observed:
[T]here are situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the 
defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request. 
For though the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness 
and vigor, he must always been faithful to his client’s overriding interest that “ justice shall 
be done.” He is the “servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer.” This description of the prosecutor’s duty illuminates the 
standard of materiality that governs his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.
 Id. at 110 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
48. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
49. Id. at 682.
50. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
51. Id. at 434.
978
PRETRIAL PROCEDURES FOR INNOCENT PEOPLE: REFORMING BRADY
that the prosecution had a system for ensuring that the police disclosed such 
information to the prosecution. In Kyles, the Court reiterated that the
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others 
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police. But 
whether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation (whether, 
that is, a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad faith), the prosecution’s 
responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a 
material level of importance is inescapable.52
 In its brief, the State of Louisiana argued that because some of the concededly 
suppressed evidence had not been disclosed by the police to the prosecutor until after 
trial, the state “should not be held accountable . . . for evidence known only to police 
investigators.”53 The Supreme Court f latly rejected this argument, holding that “the 
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” The 
Court also assumed that a prosecutor “has the means to discharge the government’s 
Brady responsibility” by establishing “procedures and regulations” to ensure a f low of 
“all relevant information” from the police to the prosecutor’s office.54
 Finally, in Strickler v. Greene,55 the Court both took an extremely constricted 
view of materiality and repeated its reliance on the unrealistic assumption that the 
prosecutors had some sort of systematic access to exculpatory information in the 
hands of the police. The Court reviewed a prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory 
materials in police files, even though the prosecutor’s office had alleged its compliance 
with an “open file” disclosure policy.56 In Strickler, the prosecutor had failed to 
disclose a series of communications with its star witness, which were later found in 
police files after the defendant’s conviction. The materials documented a course of 
police-witness interactions through which the witness’s initial failure to even notice 
the defendant or the crime changed into a dramatic and harrowing tale of certainty, 
fear, and violence.57 Undisclosed police notes of interviews with the key identification 
witness, and her undisclosed written messages to the police, showed that she initially 
could not identify the victim or Strickler, and that her memory improved only after 
several additional conversations with the police and the victim’s boyfriend.58 
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the conviction upon finding that the undisclosed 
evidence was not material.59
52. Id. at 437–38 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 438.
54. Id. at 437–38.
55. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
56. Id. at 276.
57. Id. at 273–74.
58. Id. at 273–74, 274 n.9.
59. Id. at 296.
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 There is a second way in which the Court’s interpretation of the materiality 
standard has interfered with the promise of Brady. “Materiality” is not merely an 
extremely high harmless error test; it is also the standard by which the police and 
prosecutor must judge, pretrial, whether to disclose.60 That is, the same outcome-
determinative standard governs whether a conviction should be reversed for failure to 
disclose and whether the prosecutor or police are even required to disclose something 
in the first, pretrial instance. This test requires the prosecution to “engage in a 
bizarre kind of anticipatory hindsight review.”61 That review is rendered even more 
difficult because prosecutors lack sufficient information to make the pretrial 
prediction of posttrial materiality and because it requires both the police and then 
the prosecution to overcome their own cognitive biases that lead them to arrest, 
charge, and prosecute the defendant in the first place. Then, having identified those 
weaknesses as material, this test requires prosecutors to nevertheless continue to 
prosecute the case.62
 Additionally, as noted by several scholars, Brady is severely restricted by the 
Court’s treatment of the right as a trial right in a criminal justice system in which 
ninety-five percent of criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas.63 In United 
States v. Ruiz,64 the Court held that the prosecutor was not required to disclose 
impeachment evidence prior to a guilty plea. This limitation has itself been 
exacerbated by the Court’s failure to establish any timeliness requirements, suggesting 
that as long as prosecutors produce all material, exculpatory information at some 
point before trial, they have met their due process obligations.65
 Apart from these limitations, the judiciary’s permissive interpretation of the 
prosecutor’s Brady obligation allows prosecutors to evade it, as decades of case law 
establish they have.66 Indeed, apart from errors relating to incompetent counsel, the 
60. This is the standard for judging a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, which also employs the “reasonable 
probability” materiality standard. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
61. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1587, 1610 (2006); see also Burke, supra note 40, at 485.
62. See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1542. 
63. This problem has existed for a long time. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and 
Wrongful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651 (2007); Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for 
Preplea Disclosure, 90 Yale L.J. 1581 (1981).
64. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
65. Id. at 633 (noting that the “added burden imposed upon the Government by requiring its provision [of 
material exculpatory information] well in advance of trial (often before trial preparation begins) can be 
serious, thereby significantly interfering with the administration of the plea-bargaining process”).
66. This history has been thoroughly documented by other scholars. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to 
Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 415 
(2010) (“The government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense under Brady v. Maryland 
has become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in criminal law.”); Gershman, supra 
note 39, at 10, 14–15 n.61.
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most frequent basis for wrongful convictions has been the suppression of exculpatory 
evidence.67
 Finally, as professional consensus has recognized,68 existing statutory or rule-
based requirements reflect the same flaws as the current common law doctrine.69
67. See, e.g., Eyewitness Misidentification, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/
Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
68. See infra Part II.B.2–4.
69. In 2004, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) published a report to the Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States on the treatment of Brady materials in U.S. courts. 
Laural L. Hooper et al., Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in United States District and State 
Courts’ Rules, Orders, and Policies, Fed. Jud. Center (October 2004), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/bradymat.pdf/$file/bradymat.pdf. At the request of the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, the Federal Judicial Center updated that report in 2007. Laural Hooper 
& Shelia Thorpe, Brady v. Maryland Material in the United States District Courts: Rules, Orders, and 
Policies, Fed. Jud. Center (May 31, 2007) [hereinafter FJC Report], http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/bradyma2.pdf/$file/bradyma2.pdf. According to that report, thirty-seven of the ninety-
four federal districts have a relevant local rule, order, or procedure governing disclosure of Brady 
material. Id. at 7. In defining the Brady obligation, nineteen of the thirty-seven districts use the term 
“favorable to the defendant.” Id. at 8. Nine others refer to the material as Brady material and nine others 
describe the material as evidence that is exculpatory. Id. Twenty-eight of the thirty-seven districts 
mandate automatic disclosure, nine require a request, one requires the parties to address the issue in a 
pretrial conference statement, and two presume the defendant has requested it unless the presumption is 
overcome. Id. Federal district timetables vary significantly. The most common is “within 14 days of 
arraignment,” but some districts require a response within five days of arraignment, “as soon as 
reasonably possible,” or “before trial.” Id. As to the prosecutor’s obligation to seek exculpatory evidence 
from investigators, thirteen districts have a specific due diligence requirement for prosecutors and two 
have a certificate of compliance requirement. Id. Finally, nine districts have declination procedures for 
specific types of information. Id. Detailed analysis and charts of the U.S. District Court Rules and 
Policies are set forth at pages 9–21 of the FJC Report and the actual district court materials are collected 
in Appendix B on pages 25–38 of the report. Sample orders addressing Brady disclosure are set forth in 
the FJC’s Report’s Appendix C on pages 39–41.
The 2007 report did not update its earlier 2004 survey of state codification of Brady, but included 
it as Appendix E to the FJC 2007 report. Id. at 49. The 2004 report indicated the following about state 
codification of Brady. First, thirty-three of the fifty-one jurisdictions have rules or procedures that 
codify the Brady rule. Id. at 50. Twenty-three of the thirty-three states define the material required to 
be disclosed as “any material or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the 
offense charged or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment therefor.” Id. at 51. Ten others refer 
to “exculpatory material.” Id. Although five other states use the term “favorable” in describing evidence 
subject to disclosure, all of them limit this clause with a condition that it must be “material and relevant 
to the issue of guilt or punishment.” Id. at 52. Twenty-six states use the terminology of Rule 16, requiring 
evidence that is “material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense.” Id. at 52.
Thirteen states require mandatory disclosure, regardless of whether the defendant has made a 
specific request. Id. at 54. Three of these states distinguish between information subject to mandatory 
disclosure and other information that must be requested or ordered by the court. Id. at 55. Hawaii 
requires disclosure of favorable evidence only in cases where the defendant is charged with a felony. Id. 
Thirty-eight states require a defendant to request favorable information before the prosecution’s 
obligation is triggered. Id. Ten states place an additional condition on the defense either to show that 
the items are material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable or that there is 
“good cause” for discovery of the information. Id.
All of the states require the disclosure of the types of information required by Rule 16, although 
many require more. Florida, Minnesota, and North Carolina all have “open file” discovery statutes. 
Other states have expanded their statutory disclosure obligations piecemeal by, for example, requiring 
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 Two recent, widely publicized cases—the prosecutions of Senator Ted Stevens70 
in Alaska and of W. R. Grace in Montana71—may have brought new attention to the 
issue.72 In Stevens, the trial court found that prosecutors had violated the court’s 
explicit Brady orders by doctoring documents to redact exculpatory statements, 
removing a witness from the jurisdiction upon learning the witness had exculpatory 
information, failing to turn over clearly exculpatory and inconsistent prior statements, 
and had lied repeatedly to the court about what they had done.73 Ultimately, the case 
was dismissed.74 In Grace, the prosecution’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence 
concerning its star witness (e-mails from the witness to the FBI agent that 
demonstrated his “intense prosecutorial partnership with the Government and his 
obsession with seeking revenge against” the defendants)75 led the court to (1) permit 
the defense to cross-examine the witness a second time; (2) prohibit the government 
from redirect; (3) instruct the jury that the witness was back on the stand because the 
government had violated its legal obligations; (4) instruct the jury that the U.S. 
Attorney’s office had violated its constitutional obligations, the orders of the court, 
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (5) advise the jurors to examine 
the witness’s testimony with great skepticism and caution.76 Ultimately, the case 
ended in an acquittal.77 Although the court did not find that the prosecutors had 
the disclosure of one or more of the following items: witness names and statements, all police reports, or 
all statements relating to an identification. Id. at 52–54.
In terms of timing, twenty-eight states have specific time limits for disclosure, ranging anywhere 
from within ten, twenty-five, or thirty days after arraignment to not later than thirty days prior to trial. 
Id. at 56–58. Eighteen other states have non-specific, descriptive time requirements, such as “timely,” 
“as soon as practicable,” within a reasonable time, and the like. Id. at 58–59. Generally the states 
consider disclosure timely if it is “within a sufficient time for its effective use” in preparing a defense.
Five states have a due diligence obligation that requires submission of some type of certification of 
compliance. Such a certification generally states that the prosecutor has exercised due diligence to locate 
favorable evidence and that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, all such information has been 
disclosed. Id. at 59.
70. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125267 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009). For a 
discussion of the Brady issues in the Stevens case, see Jones, supra note 66, at 415–22. 
71. See Brennan & King-Ries, supra note 33.
72. For other federal cases from the same period that involved failure to comply with disclosure obligations 
and received media attention, see United States v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 287 F. App’x 113 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009), and United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 
2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
73. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4–6, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
125267 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009) (No. 374).
74. Id. at 48. Several other federal judges also found that U.S. Attorneys committed prosecutorial 
misconduct by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants. See Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 
1322; United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2010); Jordan Weissmann, Prosecutors 
in Kidnapping Case Rebuked Over Brady, BLT: The Blog of Legal Times (June 24, 2009, 2:04 PM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/prosecutors-in-kidnapping-case-rebuked-over-brady.html.
75. Brennan & King-Ries, supra note 33, at 349.
76. Id. at 321.
77. Id. 
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committed misconduct, it did conclude that they had violated their ethical duties. As 
at least one commentator has noted, “[w]ith prosecutors [now] feeling the brunt of 
the chasm between vague legal rules and lofty ethical obligations—both individually 
and as representatives of the people—reform may finally be possible.”78
 B. Increasing Effectiveness, Encouraging Reform
  1. Introduction
 Against this overwhelming evidence of the failure of Brady ’s constitutional 
doctrine lies the promise of reform by formalizing an effective disclosure regime.
 As demonstrated above, common law development in this area has left much to 
be desired. The courts have not kept pace with the realities of wrongful convictions, 
including the findings of various commissions and studies concerning the causes of 
wrongful convictions, or with the increased opportunities for exonerations created by 
technology.79 Nor have the current federal or state statutory provisions kept pace.
 The propriety of formal, rule-based changes has recently been recognized on 
several important scholarly and professional fronts. First, a substantial contribution to 
the kinds of formalized changes that should take place was made by Cardozo Law 
School’s New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works? 
symposium. The symposium, held in November 2009, brought together approximately 
seventy-five participants—representatives from the profession, including prosecutor’s 
offices, defense lawyers, judges, as well as legal academics, cognitive scientists, social 
psychologists, and medical professionals—to discuss the realities of prosecutorial 
disclosure and to suggest changes. Second, the American Bar Association (ABA) has 
78. Id. at 322–23.
79. It may in fact be that issues surrounding wrongful convictions are particularly suitable to legislative 
response. This has been demonstrated by the approach to reform in the area of post-conviction DNA 
testing. In Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), the 
Supreme Court recognized the widespread legislative response to the need for postconviction DNA 
testing and expressly refused to impose a constitutional standard on the issue. Id. at 2322 (“The elected 
governments of the States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our criminal 
justice systems . . . as well as the opportunities it affords. To suddenly constitutionalize this area would 
short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative response.”). In that context, the 
legislatures did not wait for the courts to deal with the problem piecemeal.
As Osborne recognized, the adversary system places a limit on the extent to which a court can remedy 
the deficiencies in current law. Common law development can only occur piecemeal since the court can 
only address an issue when it is presented in a particular case. Systemic changes or revision of a complicated 
set of principles is simply not possible. This is particularly true in criminal cases for two important reasons: 
the widespread summary treatment of criminal appeals, in which no precedential law is established, and 
the fact that more than 90% of cases result in guilty pleas. Id. at 2316 (“The dilemma is how to harness 
DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal 
justice. That task belongs primarily to the legislature.”); id. at 2322 (“To suddenly constitutionalize this 
area would short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered legislative response.”); see id. at 2323 
(“Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for testing would force us to act as policymakers 
. . . .”); see also Minutes of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, U.S. Courts 
(Oct. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Minutes of Advisory Committee 2009], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf (suggesting that amendment of Rule 16 should 
most appropriately be done by Congress, rather than by court rule).
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itself recently endorsed formalization of Brady. Third, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 
(Manual) has undergone recent changes to its formal requirements.
  2. The Cardozo Symposium and a Consensus for Disclosure Checklists
 In 2009, Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky of Cardozo Law School convened a 
symposium entitled New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What 
Really Works? The stated goals of the symposium were to develop best practices to 
increase the reliability of results in criminal cases and to “optimize effective training, 
supervision, and control mechanisms for managing information within prosecutors’ 
offices.”80 The seventy-five participants were split into six Working Groups, each of 
which addressed an aspect of the disclosure issue: obligations and practices, the 
process, training and supervision, systems and culture, internal regulation, and 
external regulation. Each group met for five hours and succeeded in reaching a 
consensus among the disparate participants—prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, 
and experts—on as many aspects of their subject as possible. The findings were 
reproduced in the Cardozo Law Review.81
 The results of the Working Group on obligations and practices are the most 
relevant to this article. According to the report of that group, there was a consensus 
that the materiality standard should be omitted and that prosecutors should disclose 
“all evidence or information that they reasonably believe will be helpful to the defense 
or that could lead to admissible evidence.”82 This should be a matter of law, but, 
where not codified, should be reflected in internal policy.83 Second, to the extent that 
disclosure obligations are codified, these laws “should ideally be clear and conducive 
to ease of administration.”84 That is, participants expressed
a preference for the development of a detailed statutory framework—one that 
streamlines discovery and makes explicit exactly what should be turned 
over—even if the statute (or rule of procedure) does not establish, and perhaps 
cannot be perfectly drafted to establish, the full limit of a prosecutor’s legal 
duties.85
 Specifically, the Working Group endorsed explicit rules to ensure the full f low of 
information from the police to prosecutors and recommended that each jurisdiction 
adopt formal policies and procedures to do so. As discussed above, the Working 
Group agreed that the assumption that prosecutors can compel disclosure by the 
80. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really 
Works?, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1943, 1944 (2010).
81. Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17. 
82. Id. at 1966.
83. Id. (“The idea was not that laws would necessarily codify this principle, but insofar as the law falls short, 
prosecutors would give effect to this principle as a matter of internal policy.”).
84. Id. at 1971. 
85. Id. at 1966.
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police is unrealistic.86 State and local police generally operate independently of 
prosecutors’ offices, answer to different constituencies, and may work together over 
the course of many different cases, making their relationship extremely complicated.87 
A prosecutor’s access to exculpatory evidence depends on police cooperation in 
recording, preserving, and revealing such evidence, and, despite Kyles’s clear mandate, 
prosecutors—acting in good faith—normally lack the power to insist upon access to 
exculpatory evidence known to the police.88
 A consensus clearly emerged from the Cardozo symposium that Brady ’s 
constitutional doctrine has not been successfully applied to the realities of law 
enforcement and that something both clearer and more realistic is required. First, 
prosecutors have difficulty determining pretrial what can or will change the result of 
86. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons 
from England, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1379, 1383 (2000). In contrast to the Court’s unrealistic assumption, 
Fisher very realistically points out that the relationship between law enforcement and prosecutors is 
“governed by informal practices about which little is known.” Id. Fisher states that an English-style 
legislative solution would be the most direct and effective remedy, but expresses doubt as to whether the 
“political will” needed to pass such legislation exists in the United States. Id. at 1385. Accordingly, 
Fisher puts forth amendments to both the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA 
Standards for the Prosecution Function that would “aim to reinforce the prosecutor’s responsibilities 
under Brady and Kyles v. Whitley to obtain access to relevant information known to the police.” Id. 
Specifically, Fisher proposes adding the following subparagraphs to Model Rule 3.8, and to Prosecution 
Function Standards 3-2.7 and 3-3.11:
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
. . . .
[Proposed] (c-1) make reasonable efforts to ensure that investigators, law enforcement 
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal 
case reveal to the prosecutor’s office all material and information that tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused or mitigates the offense or sentence.
STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION
3-2.7. Relations with Police
. . . . 
[Proposed] (c) A prosecutor should become familiar with existing law enforcement record-
keeping practices in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.
[Proposed] (d) The prosecutor should encourage and assist law enforcement agencies to adopt a 
uniform police report that will contain all information necessary for a successful prosecution 
and for compliance with the prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable information to the defense.
3-3.11. Disclosure of Evidence by the Prosecutor
[Proposed] (a-1) A prosecutor should make reasonable efforts to ensure that all material and 
information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or 
which would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused is provided by investigative personnel 
to the prosecutor’s office.
 Id. at 1424.
87. Id. at 1382–83 (citing Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory 
Evidence in Police Reports, 28 New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1993)). 
88. Fisher, supra note 86, at 1384.
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a future trial, if they are trying in good faith to comply. Even if they did, such a 
decision requires that they overcome well-recognized cognitive biases, cease being 
advocates, and suddenly become objective about the merits of their own cases.89 
Second, the constitutional doctrine that imputes police suppression to prosecutors is 
based on the Court’s naive and untested assumption that there is a way for prosecutors 
to compel disclosure by the police—again, even if all parties are proceeding in good 
faith.90 As a result, the doctrine has failed to ensure that the police reveal exculpatory 
information to prosecutors in the first instance. In addition, the police have even less 
of an idea of what needs to be disclosed than the prosecutors and have fewer 
professional restraints on their cognitive biases.91 There is no doubt that “police 
generally want to do a good job, and that . . . [they] tend to be rule driven.”92 As 
such, “formal rules can help them in their efforts to do a good job.”93
 Accordingly, the Working Group reached a consensus that each jurisdiction 
should use checklists to “ensure full and timely transfer of all relevant information 
from police to prosecutors.”94 These checklists would be technology based, would be 
provided by prosecutors to the police, and would require that all types of information 
on the checklist be provided to the prosecutors.95
 Significantly, the consensus of the Working Group was that “developing 
constructive and productive relationships with law enforcement can be one of the most 
difficult aspects of the prosecutor’s job.”96 Different cultures and distrust abound, with 
perceived “gulf[s] in motivations and incentives.”97 The Working Group concluded that 
checklists might make the relationship more productive.98 Police experts also thought 
such formal rules would help the police.99 Indeed, it was noted that police are 
comfortable working with checklists in other areas and work best with clear rules, 
expectations, and training.100 In addition, the Working Group recommended that 
police be involved in pretrial discovery conferences with the court, the idea being that 
such involvement would increase police accountability to the courts and prosecutors, 
89. See Gershman, supra note 39.
90. See supra note 27.
91. Report of the Working Group on Best Practices, supra note 17, at 1975.
92. Id. 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1974.
95. Id. “Remarkably,” the Working Group noted, “such a straightforward data system is not available in 
most prosecutors’ offices.” Id. at 2006.
96. Id. at 2023.
97. Id. at 2024.
98. Id. at 1994.
99. Id. at 1975.
100. Id. 
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and thus increase the likelihood of full cooperation and compliance by the police.101 
The courts might also require prosecutors to provide certifications of compliance. The 
group also recommended a variety of checklist requirements, including a checklist of 
items disclosed and privileged items withheld.102
 Interestingly, the recommendation of checklists “grew from several 
considerations.”103 Apparently, in the medical field, risk management has shifted its 
focus from prevention of individual errors to creating systems that provide support 
for performing a job correctly, rather than using threats of punishment.104 Under this 
theory, a formalized checklist can be a tool that helps police identify and transfer 
required information.105 In addition, it is clear that police generally want to do a 
good job and because police “tend to be rule driven, formal rules can help them in 
their efforts to do a good job.”106 Police are also accustomed to working with 
checklists in other areas. Third, since cognitive biases impede effective investigation 
and disclosure, a checklist would counteract such bias. Finally, some jurisdictions 
have already begun using checklists.107
 To be effective, checklists would ideally be filled out in real time, by a third party, 
with audits of police compliance and perhaps mandatory police participation in pretrial 
discovery conferences. If prosecutors determine that they have not received everything 
they should, they would submit a formal request to police with the specific information 
requested.108 The group suggested that an expert panel develop model checklists that 
could then be tailored to meet particular, local needs.109 Finally, the Working Group 
on internal regulations also recommended that prosecutors develop checklists that 
“enumerate the categories or items of evidence to be disclosed in the course of a criminal 
case, as well as other tasks associated with the discovery process.”110
101. Id. at 1978–79.
102. Id. at 2033.
103. Id. at 1974.
104. Id. at 1974–75.
105. Id. at 1975.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1976. For example, Prince George’s County, Maryland, uses a formal charging memo, which 
“essentially serves as an information checklist.” Id. The Working Group noted that such a form could easily 
be adapted to become the sort of checklist they envisioned. The Working Group also reported that in 
Oregon, “a new paperless file system will allow scanning [and coding] of documents . . . to identify what kind 
of records they are, and whether they have been disclosed to the defense.” Id. The Working Group noted that 
this kind of electronic file management system “has the potential to facilitate creation and use of an electronic 
checklist.” Id. Specifically, the Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney’s Office has implemented a 
checklist system for major homicide cases whereby one person is responsible for maintaining a “Homicide 
Major Crimes Discovery Assignment” form, which is “designed to ensure that job tasks, performance 
standards, and due dates are all met on all matters related to discovery.” Id. The Working Group noted that 
such an approach works well in big cases but acknowledged that it cannot be implemented in all cases. Id.
108. Id. at 1974.
109. Id. at 1977.
110. Id. at 2012.
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 At the same time, the current police disclosure obligations fail to take account of 
technological advances. The Working Group recognized that the most effective use of 
checklists involves “real time” entries. Several participants noted that their document 
management software could be used to include checklists of tasks, deadlines, and 
confirmation of completion.111 Police disclosure could also be supported by giving the 
police access to smart phones or netbooks that would simultaneously deliver information 
to prosecutors. The standardized checklists and disclosure obligations discussed in 
more detail below can be programmed into these devices.112
 Finally, rules on timeliness that have not been developed judicially can more 
appropriately be prescribed legislatively, as evidenced by many federal and state rules 
governing timely disclosure.113 In those jurisdictions without such rules, timeliness can 
be better assured by statutorily prescribed time limitations. If this is accomplished, more 
information will be disclosed in time to render proceedings fairer and more reliable.
  3. Organized Professional Reform Efforts
 The organized bar has also recommended steps to formalize prosecutorial 
disclosure. Currently, prosecutorial disclosure is governed in federal courts by Rule 
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.114 In 2003, the American College of 
Trial Lawyers (ACTL) proposed amending Rule 16 by adding a new section that 
would require disclosure within fourteen days of a request of “all information 
favorable to the defendant,” without a requirement of materiality.115 The prosecutor 
would be required to disclose all such information that “is known to the attorney(s) 
for the government or to any government agent(s), law enforcement officers or others 
who have acted as investigators from any federal, state, or local agencies who have 
participated in either the investigation or prosecution of the events underlying the 
crimes charged.”116 The proposed amendment also required due diligence by the 
prosecutor in locating information and established deadlines for disclosure.117 The 
111. Id. at 2021.
112. See infra Part IV.A–B.
113. See supra note 69; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (stating that the legislature is the 
appropriate place for setting speedy-trial time periods).
114. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Under Rule 16, the prosecution must disclose: (1) statements made by the 
defendant; (2) the defendant’s prior criminal record; (3) documents and tangible objects within the 
government’s possession that are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense or are intended 
for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the 
defendant; (4) reports of examinations and tests that are material to the preparation of the defense; and 
(5) written summaries of expert testimony that the government intends to use during its case in chief at 
trial. Id.
115. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93, 111 (2004).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Department of Justice (DOJ) opposed the recommendation on the grounds that no 
codification was warranted.
 However, following the ACTL’s recommendation, the ABA’s Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules began to explore the question of amending Rule 16 
to further codify and expand the government’s disclosure obligation. The DOJ 
continually opposed any amendment, and, as an alternative to amending Rule 16, 
revised the text of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual regarding disclosure. In 2006, the 
Advisory Committee met to determine whether to forward the draft Rule 16 
amendment to the Standing Committee for publication or to rely on the DOJ’s 
revision of the Manual. Ultimately, the Committee voted 8–4 to forward the 
amendment to the Standing Committee.118 The Standing Committee deferred 
consideration of the amendment.119
 Most recently, in February 2010, the ABA’s House of Delegates passed Report 
102D, Judicial Role in Avoiding Wrongful Convictions, in which it urged all U.S. courts 
to adopt a procedure disseminating “to the prosecution and defense a written checklist 
delineating in detail the general disclosure obligations of the prosecution under . . . 
[Brady] and its progeny and applicable ethical standards.”120 It was further resolved 
that all courts should create a standing committee of local prosecutors and defense 
attorneys “to assist the court in formulating and updating the written checklist 
delineating in detail the prosecution’s general disclosure obligations.”121 Finally, “any 
omissions or deficiencies in the written checklist” should not relieve either party “of 
their legal and ethical responsibilities with respect to providing and seeking 
disclosures.”122 This set of resolutions is part of the ABA’s study “of how the judiciary 
may minimize the danger of wrongful convictions.”123
118. FJC Report, supra note 69, at 6–7; see also Minutes of Advisory Committee 2009, supra note 79; Brennan 
& King-Ries, supra note 33, at 330–31. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
Exculpatory or Impeaching Information. Upon a defendant’s request, the government 
must make available all information that is known to the attorney for the government 
or agents of law enforcement involved in the investigation of the case that is either 
exculpatory or impeaching. The court may not order disclosure of impeachment 
information earlier than 14 days before trial.
 FJC Report, supra note 69, at Appendix A.
119. One of the two reasons given by the Standing Committee was that there were “questions whether a need 
for the change had been sufficiently shown.” Minutes of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Criminal Rules, U.S. Courts (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Minutes/CR10-2007-min.pdf. The other reason was a concern that the government would be 
required to disclose information that is not “material.” Id.
120. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Urges Changes to Criminal Trial Court Procedures, ABA Now, http://www.abanow.
org/2011/01/104a/ (adopting, as revised, Resolution 104A).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates: 102D (2010), 
http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/themes/ABANow/wp-content/uploads/resolution-
pdfs/MY2010/102D.pdf.
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 The ABA has been active on another front: revising the ABA Prosecution and 
Defense Function Standards, including the standards relating to prosecutorial 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence. The proposed revision, which is still in the 
drafting stages and thus not yet public, contains a broad definition of disclosable 
evidence without reference to its materiality and directs that the prosecutor promptly 
seek, identify, ensure the preservation of, and disclose such evidence.124 The 1993 
standard only directed a prosecutor not to “intentionally fail” to make timely 
disclosure of information, and it defined the scope of the information without 
reference to impeachment (i.e., as evidence that would “negate the guilt of the 
accused or mitigate the offense charged, or . . . reduce the punishment of the 
accused”).125
 The revision also addresses the prosecutor’s obligation to seek exculpatory 
evidence from investigating agencies. In short, the revision includes a new subdivision 
that directs the prosecutor to promptly advise other government agencies involved in 
the case concerning their duties to identify, preserve, and share disclosable evidence, 
as defined above, and to make reasonable efforts to discover such information.126
  4. Revision of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
 Finally, as noted above, in January 2010, the Department of Justice revised the 
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s provisions on disclosure. In short, the revised Manual 
requires prosecutors to disclose information “beyond that which is ‘material’ to 
guilt.”127 It recognizes, however, that the trial should be limited to relevant and 
significantly probative information and that evidence that is not significantly 
probative should not be subject to disclosure.128 According to the revised Manual, 
the prosecutor must also disclose, without regard to materiality: (1) information 
“inconsistent with any element of any crime charged”;129 (2) information that 
“establishes a recognized affirmative defense”;130 and (3) impeachment information 
that “casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence . . . the prosecutor 
intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or [that] might have a 
significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.”131 Unlike the Brady 
124. ABA Task Force to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function, Standards, Prosecution Function, 
June 2010 draft (on file with author).
125. Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function § 3-3.11(a) (1993). 
126. Id. 
127. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-5.001(C) (1997) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual], http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(1)
130. Id. 
131. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(2).
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doctrine, the Manual requires the disclosure of information, “regardless of whether 
the information subject to disclosure would itself constitute admissible evidence.”132
 In its comment section, the Manual refers the reader to Criminal Resource Manual 
165, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery, which was itself updated in 
January 2010.133 This Resource Manual is a Memorandum for Department Prosecutors 
from Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden (Ogden Memorandum).134 Like the 
Cardozo Law Review symposium report, the Ogden Memorandum is a consensus 
document. Here, the consensus represents the conclusions of a working group of federal 
prosecutors.135
 The Ogden Memorandum divides the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation into 
steps. Step 1: Gathering and Reviewing Discovery Information; Step 2: Conducting 
the Review; Step 3: Making the Disclosures; and Step 4: Making a Record. First, in 
relevant part, the Ogden Memorandum advises that the prosecutor “should be 
granted access to the substantive case file and any other file or document the 
prosecutor has reason to believe may contain discoverable information related to the 
matter being prosecuted.”136 It continues by stating that “[g]enerally, all evidence and 
information gathered during the investigation should be reviewed.” It also states that 
where the potentially discoverable information is voluminous, prosecutors may satisfy 
this obligation by disclosing the information to the defense.137 Finally, “substantive 
case-related communications” that may contain discoverable information should be 
maintained in a case file or otherwise preserved and reviewed carefully.138
 As to Step 2, “Conducting the Review,” the Ogden Memorandum advises that 
prosecutors may delegate the review of this material but that the disclosure 
determination should not be delegated.139
 In Step 3, “Making the Disclosures,” prosecutors are “encouraged to provide 
discovery [that is] broader and more comprehensive than the discovery obligations” 
132. Id. § 9-5.001(C)(3).
133. Id. § 9-5.001(F).
134. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding 
Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum], http://www.justice.gov/dag/
discovery-guidance.html.
135. Ogden Memorandum, supra note 134. The memorandum explains that it was developed at Ogden’s 
request “by a working group of experienced attorneys with expertise regarding criminal discovery issues 
that included attorneys from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, 
the Criminal Division, and the National Security Divisions” of the DOJ. Comments were also received 
from the Office of the Attorney General, the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, the Criminal 
Chiefs Working Group, the Appellate Chiefs Working Group, the Professional Responsibility Advisory 
Office, and the Office of Professional Responsibility. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. 
138. Id. For the purpose of this step, “‘[s]ubstantive’ communications include factual reports about 
investigative activity, factual discussions of the relative merits of evidence, factual information obtained 
during interviews or interactions with witnesses/victims, and factual issues relating to credibility.” Id.
139. Id.
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set forth in Brady, Giglio, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.140 Prosecutors are 
cautioned not to describe this process as “open file” discovery, because that title can 
be misleading. Disclosure should take place “reasonably promptly after discovery,” 
with prior witness statements disclosed “at a reasonable time before trial to allow the 
trial to proceed efficiently” but consistent, again, with countervailing considerations, 
such as witness and national security.141
 Finally, as to Step 4 “Making a Record,” the Ogden Memorandum stresses the 
importance of keeping good records of when and how information is disclosed, 
particularly in order to avoid time consuming disputes and to enable meaningful 
responses to future claims of post-conviction relief.142
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STATUTORY DISCLOSURE SCHEME
 The same evolutionary process that occurred in the United States occurred in the 
United Kingdom. Until the 1980s, prosecutorial disclosure in the United Kingdom 
was largely dictated by common law.143 Then, following a series of notorious 
miscarriages of justice based on suppression of exculpatory evidence in cases arising 
out of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorism prosecutions, several major 
reforms were enacted. 144 The U.K. government acted quickly: in the aftermath of 
these cases, Parliament passed the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
(CPIA).145
 Briefly, under the CPIA, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA), 
the prosecution’s obligation is to disclose any “unused” material that “might reasonably 
be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused 
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. 
143. See Mike Redmayne, Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents, 2004 Crim. L. Rev. 
441, 441, 442. For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the U.K. disclosure regime, see Lissa 
Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
1241, 1251–53 (2001), and Fisher, supra note 86. 
144. Griffin, supra note 143; Fisher, supra note 86 at 1390–91.
145. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25 (U.K.). The CPIA’s disclosure provisions were 
supplemented by the Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (U.K.). The major amendment was to omit the 
distinction between a prosecutor’s primary and secondary disclosure duties and to enact, instead, an 
initial duty to disclose that continues throughout the proceedings. The current, updated version is the 
subject of this discussion.
The United Kingdom has not only codified its Brady provisions, unlike the U.S. Congress, but 
also published several documents that detail what exactly must be done by the police and the prosecution 
with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory material. See Crown Prosecution Serv., Disclosure 
Manual (2005) [hereafter Disclosure Code], http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/; 
Crown Prosecution Serv., Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure (2005) [hereinafter 
AG’s Guidelines], http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/attorney_generals_guidelines_on_disclosure/; 
Judiciary of England and Wales, Disclosure: A Protocol for the Control and Management 
of Unused Material in the Crown Court [hereinafter Court of Appeals Protocol], http://www.
judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Protocols/crown_courts_disclosure.pdf.
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or of assisting the case for the accused.”146 This is an objective standard, replacing the 
previous subjective standard that required disclosure of any unused material that, “in 
the prosecutor’s opinion[,] might undermine” the prosecution’s case.147 The prosecutor 
makes the disclosure determination based on two schedules that must be provided to 
the prosecution by the police: a schedule of sensitive unused material and a schedule 
of nonsensitive unused material.148 These schedules provide the prosecution with 
access to the information in police files.
 One important difference between the U.S. and U.K. disclosure regimes is that 
there is a detailed statutory code of practice in the United Kingdom (the “Disclosure 
Code” or the “Code”) that covers what must be disclosed, by whom, and when.149 
This Disclosure Code is binding as a statute and is much more detailed and specific 
than any other existing U.S. statute, court rule, or internal memoranda.150
 A. Police Disclosure Obligations
 Under the CPIA and the Disclosure Code, the police must
 (1) take “all reasonable steps . . . for the purposes of the investigation,” and 
investigators must “pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards 
or away from the suspect.”151 Such an obligation may include making inquiries of 
third parties or investigators in other investigations or prosecutions.152
 (2) inform the prosecutor “as early as possible whether any material weakens the 
case against the accused.”153
 (3) “[r]ecord and retain” “all material” that “may be relevant to the investigation,” 
i.e., information that appears to have “some bearing on any offence under investigation 
or any person being investigated, or on the surrounding circumstances of the case, 
unless it is incapable of having any impact on the case.”154 Appendix A to this article 
contains a chart listing the kinds of unused materials that may be created. By U.S. 
standards, the list is extensive.
146. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.). 
147. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 32 (U.K.); Redmayne, supra note 143, at 442.
148. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, at ch. 6.
149. See generally Disclosure Code, supra note 145.
150. Compare Disclosure Code, supra note 145, with U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 127.
151. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶¶ 3.5, 4.2.
152. Id. ¶ 4.4. The provisions of the Code prescribe detailed steps that must be taken to obtain unused 
evidence from third parties. Id. ¶¶ 4.4–.27.
153. Id. ¶ 2.2.
154. Id. ¶ 5.2. The importance of the retention and recording requirement is obvious; unless information is 
retained and recorded, it cannot be revealed. See Fisher, supra note 86, at 1402, for his observation of 
police training sessions on the duty to pursue, record and retain exculpatory evidence. Professor Fisher 
attended several police disclosure training sessions and sets forth the participants’ experiences with, and 
their recordings of, “negative” evidence, including contradictory witness accounts, failures to identify 
the primary suspect, a retracted identification, confirmation of the defendant’s whereabouts at another 
location, and incorrect preservation of real evidence that rendered it inadmissible. Id.
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 (4) appoint an investigator, a disclosure officer, and an officer in charge of an 
investigation disclosure officer,155 who must then list the retained materials on 
schedules to be turned over to the prosecution; 156
 (5) turn the schedules over to the prosecution, certify that all retained material 
has been revealed, and give the prosecution access to all investigatory materials in 
their possession.157
  1. Retention 
 Paragraph 5 of the Disclosure Code also specifies what types of material should 
routinely be retained. Again, by U.S. standards, the list is incredibly detailed and 
extensive.158 And, when there is any doubt about the relevance of any material, the 
investigator must retain it.
  2. Scheduling (Checklists) 
 In addition, paragraph 6 of the Disclosure Code requires that the material be 
listed on a schedule of non-sensitive material (Form MG6C)159 and a schedule of 
sensitive material (Form MG6D).160 Sensitive material is material that the 
investigating officer believes would not be in the public interest to disclose, including 
national security information, information identifying police informants or the 
location of surveillance, and material relating to children.161 All such material must 
still be disclosed to the prosecutor with an explanation by the disclosure officer as to 
why she believes disclosure would “give rise to a real risk of serious prejudice to an 
important public interest.” 162 This schedule is not disclosed to the defense.163
 The material on both schedules must be listed in sufficient detail for the 
prosecutor to decide whether she needs to inspect the actual material before deciding 
155. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶¶ 3.1–.5.
156. Id. ¶ 3.9. 
157. Id. ¶¶ 3.9–.13.
158. The list includes: crime reports, custody records, records of any telephone calls, final versions of witness 
statements and draft versions if they differ, interview records, communications between the police and 
experts, information provided by an accused that indicates an explanation for the offense, any material 
casting doubt on the reliability of a confession, any material casting doubt on the reliability of a witness, 
and records of first description of a suspect by each potential witness who purports to identify or describe 
the suspect, whether or not the description differs from that of subsequent descriptions by that or other 
witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 5.1–.28.
159. Id. ¶ 6.4.
160. See infra Appendix A. 
161. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 8.4.
162. Id. ¶ 8.2.
163. Id. ¶ 8.1. The disclosure of sensitive unused material is governed by detailed provisions in the Disclosure 
Code in Chapters 8 and 9. Because this article addresses the disclosure of non-sensitive materials, 
generally, those provisions will not be discussed at length.
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whether to disclose it to the defense.164 The disclosure officer must certify that “all 
relevant material has been identified, considered and revealed to the prosecutor.”165
 B. Prosecutorial Disclosure
 Upon receipt of the police schedules, the prosecutor must review them and, if 
there appears to be a mistake or omission, must seek additional disclosure from the 
police.166 Disclosure to the defense, however, should not be delayed. If, following the 
attempt to get further detail from the police, “the prosecutor remains dissatisfied 
with the quality or content of the schedules, the matter must be raised with a senior 
officer and persisted with if necessary.”167
 After review, the prosecutor must disclose to the accused any material “which 
might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution 
against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused” (also known as “the 
disclosure test”).168 This is an objective test.169 Under the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines, the prosecutor must disclose anything “that tends to show a fact 
inconsistent with the elements of the case that must be proved by the prosecution.” 
This includes material that may be used on cross-examination, that might support a 
motion to exclude evidence or a motion to dismiss, that might reveal that any public 
authority has acted incompatibly with the accused’s rights, or that suggests “an 
explanation or partial explanation of the accused’s actions.”170 Specifically enumerated 
examples are any materials that: (1) cast doubt on the accuracy of any prosecution 
evidence; (2) may point to another person, whether charged or not (including a 
co-accused), as having involvement in the commission of the offence; (3) may cast 
doubt on the reliability of a confession; (4) might go to the reliability of a prosecution 
witness; (5) might support a defense that is either raised by the defense or apparent 
from the prosecution papers; (6) may have a bearing on the admissibility of any 
164. Id. ¶¶ 7.2–.5.
165. Id. ¶ 10.16. The certification set forth in the Disclosure Code reads as follows: 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, all relevant material which has been retained 
and made available to me has been inspected, viewed or listened to and revealed to the 
prosecutor in accordance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as 
amended, the Code of Practice and the Attorney General’s Guidelines.
 Id.
166. Id. ¶ 11.8. Section 11.6 also lists the documents a prosecutor should expect to receive from the police, 
including “all material that the disclosure officer believes satisfies the disclosure test and a brief 
explanation for that belief,” as well as the schedules, forms, and certification. Id. ¶ 11.6. 
167. Id. ¶ 11.8. Records of any decisions, enquiries or requests and the date upon which they were made 
should be kept on a “disclosure record sheet.” Id. ¶¶ 11.13–.14, Annex C.
168. Id. ¶ 11.3; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 3(1)(a) (U.K.).
169. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 444.
170. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 12.8; AG’s Guidelines, supra note 145, ¶¶ 10–14.
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prosecution evidence; and (7) relate to the accused mental or physical health, 
intellectual capacity, or ill treatment.171
 The prosecutor’s disclosure decisions must be recorded on the schedule, which 
must then be signed, dated, and sent to the defense.172
 On the other hand, if a prosecutor believes that disclosure will compromise 
national security or result in the destruction of evidence or harm to a victim or 
witness, she may apply to the court for public interest immunity.173 Unlike the 
prosecution’s disclosure duties, the principles relating to public interest immunity are 
governed largely by common law.174 Information should be disclosed if it “may prove 
the defendant’s innocence or avoid a miscarriage of justice,”175 but in reality the courts 
employ a balancing test, weighing the public’s interest in nondisclosure against the 
defendant’s need for the material.176 Depending on the nature of the evidence, the 
court will also decide whether the defense should be informed of the application and 
the type of material involved and given an opportunity to respond; whether the 
defense should be informed of the hearing but with the hearing conducted ex parte; 
or whether the defense should not be informed of the hearing at all.177 The latter, 
entirely ex parte, procedure is rarely used.178
 After the prosecution’s primary, or initial, disclosure, the defense has an obligation 
to file a defense statement setting forth the nature of the defense, the matters on 
which they take issue with the prosecution, and the reasons they do so. Details of 
any particular defenses and points of law on which the defense will rely are also 
required. The defense must also give names, addresses, and dates of birth of any 
witnesses it intends to call and the names and addresses of any experts consulted, 
whether they will be called at trial or not. “[U]nless the contrary is proved, defense 
statements [are] deemed to have been given with the authority of the accused;” 
therefore, a negative inference may be drawn against the accused if the defense at 
trial includes something omitted or different from the contents of the defense 
171. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, ¶ 12.11. The prosecution is admonished to “borne in mind” that 
although material viewed in isolation might not be considered capable of undermining the prosecution’s 
case, “several items together [can] have that effect.” Id. ¶ 12.12.
172. Id. ¶¶ 12.18–.33, 12.36. In fact, the code goes so far as to prescribe specific initial abbreviations that 
should be used, e.g., D, I, CND.
173. Detailed guidance about the standards and procedures for consideration of public interest immunity 
applications are set forth in Chapter 13 of the Disclosure Code and by the House of Lords. Disclosure 
Code, supra note 145, at ch. 13; R v. H & C, [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [148] (appeal taken 
from Eng.); R v. Davis, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 613 (Eng.). Again, the detailed procedures governing applications 
for public interest immunity are beyond the scope of this article and will be only briefly described.
174. See R v. H & C, [2004] UKHL 3, [2004] 2 A.C. 134 (H.L.) [148] (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Keane, 
[1994] 1 W.L.R. 746 (Eng.).
175. R v. Keane, [1994] 1 W.L.R. 746 [751–52] (Eng.).
176. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 458.
177. Detailed standards and rules governing these procedures are set forth in Chapter 13 of the Disclosure 
Code. Disclosure Code, supra note 145, at ch. 13.
178. Redmayne, supra note 143, at 454–55.
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statement.179 The prosecutor has a continuing duty to provide unused evidence after 
the defense statement is filed. The more detailed the defense statement, the greater 
the prosecution’s burden to come forward with unused material that might aid the 
defense.180
 Thus, in several ways, the U.K. regime is likely to provide greater disclosure than 
the U.S. scheme: first, it makes the police investigation relatively neutral by requiring 
the police to record, retain, and reveal all relevant information; second, it structures 
the communications between police investigators and the prosecutor (who now 
knows what specific items they must obtain from the investigators before trial); and 
third, it provides the defense access to the schedules of nonsensitive relevant material. 
This is the system that gives prosecutors regular access to information that is in the 
hands of the police—information the Kyles Court assumed prosecutors already had.181 
And, in contrast to prevailing U.S. practices, the U.K. scheme does not rely 
extensively on the good faith or discretion of the police and prosecutors, problematic 
assumptions about their relationship, or naive and unrealistic estimations of their 
ability to switch hats between advocate and minister of justice to find and reveal 
potentially fatal weaknesses in their cases.182
IV. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE REGIME
 The substance of a model Brady regime is set forth in Appendix B of this article. 
Whether it be formalized in a statute, court rule, or internal directive, the prosecutor’s 
obligation to disclose favorable evidence will not be meaningfully effective until it is 
memorialized in a formal document of some kind. As demonstrated above, the 
common law development of this constitutional obligation has not been successful.183
179. Id. at 446. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act’s provisions for the defense statement were 
expanded by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. For a thorough discussion of the problems and objections to 
the requirement of defense disclosure, see id. at 446–54.
180. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 37 (U.K.). This gets rid of the primary/secondary disclosure 
distinction that was part of section 7 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act. See Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, § 7 (U.K.); see also Redmayne, supra note 143, at 444–45.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 50–54
182. See supra Part III.A–B.
183. The debate about whether to formalize or codify various aspects of the common law is centuries old and 
has been expertly described elsewhere. See generally Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify—That Is 
the Question: A Study of New York’s Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 641 (1992). As to 
the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations in general, the debate has largely been resolved in favor of 
codification. Thus, the prosecutor’s limited obligation to disclose inculpatory information is codified in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in many state statutes. See supra note 69. The prosecutor’s 
obligation to disclose exculpatory information is also generally set forth in the Federal Rules, and all states 
and thirty-seven of the ninety-four U.S. district courts have already codified it, albeit in a general way.
What we propose here is to make the existing statutory or rule-based provisions more detailed and 
explicit. This proposal is supported by the arguments in favor of codification generally—that it (1) 
makes the law more accessible, clearer, and more effective; (2) permits reform; and (3) provides 
uniformity. Opponents of codification generally argue that codification: (1) is unnecessary because the 
common law system is working; (2) prevents development of the law; and (3) politicizes the law. See 
Salken, supra, at 664–703. In short, it is clear that the existing ad hoc common law Brady regime is not 
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 A. A New Standard: Reasonably Helpful Information
 The proposed disclosure statute would broaden the prosecutor’s obligation to 
disclose from the current “material favorable evidence” requirement to a disclosure of 
“reasonably helpful information.” The proposed standard is consistent with current 
reform efforts. It will make the job of the police and prosecutors unquestionably 
easier, remove the distorting effect of cognitive bias and the schizophrenic demands 
of the current doctrine, and do away with the demands of 20/20 foresight. Police and 
prosecutors do not have to abandon their law enforcement roles, overcome their 
cognitive biases, or know the precise contours of the defense in order to determine 
what might be viewed by an objective observer as “helpful.”
 B. Checklists
 A key provision of my proposal is the requirement that the police complete 
disclosure checklists of what the United Kingdom calls “unused material,” and what 
we would call “favorable information.” A copy of a proposed checklist is attached as 
Appendix C. Given modern technology, these standardized checklists could be 
maintained on computers or smart phones. Preferably, as recognized in nonlegal 
contexts, a third party, such as a superior officer, would be responsible for making 
sure these checklists are completed and for turning them over to the prosecutor in 
charge of the case.
 This checklist regime would finally provide conformity between the law and 
reality by ensuring that, as Kyles assumes, prosecutors have a systematic way to 
discover exculpatory information in the hands of the police. In addition, it will go far 
to prevent undisclosed information from being hidden, only to be discovered 
serendipitously after conviction. Suppressed information will no longer be hidden 
from view, particularly if the checklists become part of the pretrial Brady conference 
recommended by the ABA.
 The ABA and the participants at the Cardozo symposium represent a professional 
consensus that specific and detailed requirements—set forth in checklists—should 
be developed to ensure appropriate disclosure. Certainly, as recommended by the 
ABA, each jurisdiction could develop its own checklist. The proposed checklist in 
Appendix C is offered to assist this effort. It is based on the current state of knowledge 
about what sorts of suppressed information most frequently exist in wrongful 
conviction cases. There is no reason to ignore this knowledge; indeed, judging by 
recent reform efforts, there apparently is professional impatience to confront it. 
Moreover, there is a professional consensus that we cannot continue to pretend that 
the Kyles obligation can be satisfied by existing approaches.184
working and is not likely to be developed or reformed effectively in the courts. Moreover, a balancing of 
the public’s interests against the defendant’s interest in fairness and accuracy is appropriately done by the 
legislature, rather than by the courts.
184. Although several jurisdictions now follow an “open file” disclosure regime, that kind of disclosure is not 
preferable to a checklist system for several reasons. First, “open file” disclosure still depends entirely on 
whether the police chose to disclose information to the prosecution in the first instance. It does not 
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 C. Timing
 Absent local rules or judicial decisions, there is no uniformity as to when defendants 
receive exculpatory information, and there is currently no requirement that they even 
receive it before entering a guilty plea. The ABA’s recommendation that the court 
convene a pretrial discovery conference specifically addressing the prosecutor’s Brady 
obligation should also address the timing of the conference. In the absence of such a 
mandated conference, the proposed statute resolves the problem by requiring that 
exculpatory information be disclosed within fourteen days of the defendant’s first 
appearance or within fourteen days of a request, whichever comes first, with a 
continuing disclosure obligation thereafter. Prosecutors would remain free to apply for 
an extension or protective order under the public interest exception.185
 There are, of course, other possibilities. One possibility is to require disclosure 
“as soon as practicable.” Many existing statutes do that, but it is really a requirement 
without teeth. Because disclosure of favorable information impacts a defendant’s plea 
decisions and trial strategy, it is important that some specific deadline be imposed so 
that information will be disclosed early in the process. Courts that have addressed 
the timeliness question generally have reversed convictions where information was 
not disclosed at a time when it could be used effectively at trial or at a plea 
provide any mechanism for ensuring that disclosure. Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 781, 786–87 (1999) (commenting that “open file” discovery may not include 
summaries of witness interviews or statements of witnesses whose safety needs to be protected). Second, 
“[t]o the extent that an ‘open file’ policy represents to a defendant that a prosecutor has disclosed 
everything in her file relevant to the case,” it can mislead defense counsel into believing that no 
exculpatory information exists and will certainly lull counsel into “believing that he need take no further 
action to enforce discovery requirements.” Gershman, supra note 43, at 544. Such evidence is commonly 
omitted from disclosure by even the most well-intentioned prosecutors using “open file” policies. 
However, Professor Gershman also sheds light on the potential for egregious misuse of “open file” 
policies in his documentation of one of the “most notorious perpetrators” of this type of misconduct, 
Carmen Marino, the former chief prosecutor in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Id. at 547. Marino’s unethical 
use of an “open file” policy consisted of the following arrangement: defense counsel was taken into the 
prosecutor’s office for the purpose of allowing “defense counsel to look at the file”; however, defense 
counsel was not allowed to physically view police reports, which were read aloud to defense counsel by a 
prosecutor. Id. at 547–48. Subsequent legal proceedings years later revealed that “critical Brady evidence 
was hidden from the defense” through the use of this ploy “to lull the defense into believing it had 
received a complete accounting of the prosecutor’s f ile.” Id. at 548. And, as Strickler v. Greene 
demonstrates, through the pretense of transparency, prosecutors have the ability to withhold Brady 
evidence from the defense. See 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Even those prosecutors who boast that they disclose 
everything candidly acknowledge that much evidence is not disclosed under this policy. Among the 
evidence that is not ordinarily disclosed are a prosecutor’s work product, summaries of interviews with 
witnesses, notes and communications with other law enforcement officials, information that is privileged 
or confidential, and information whose disclosure might threaten the safety of witnesses.
“Open file” discovery also may protect nondisclosure where a prosecutor claims to have 
inadvertently slipped up. And some prosecutors use an “open file” discovery policy to overwhelm the 
defense with massive amounts of documents, including potential Brady evidence, that are virtually 
impossible to read and digest in the limited time available. See Gershman, supra note 43, at 542–46.
185. See infra Part IV.D.
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proceeding.186 The fourteen-day requirement would be most likely to result in 
disclosure at a time when defense counsel can make use of the information.
 D. Public Interest Immunity
 Prosecutors know that other agencies withhold Brady evidence. Governmental 
agencies involved in an investigation may decide not to disclose Brady evidence to the 
prosecutor for several reasons, including a fear that disclosure may undermine the 
safety of witnesses, compromise the integrity of the case, or damage other ongoing 
investigations.
 Under the proposed statute, the prosecution may apply for a protective order 
limiting, deferring, or denying discovery if the prosecution can establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that disclosure as contemplated will create an unacceptable risk 
of (1) harm to a witness, (2) destruction of evidence, or (3) harm to an ongoing 
investigation.187 The application shall be on notice to the defense. The category of 
information for which an exception is sought must be given, although the specific 
nature of the information need not be revealed.
 E. The Burden of Proof
 As has been demonstrated, one aspect of Brady that has contributed to its 
ineffectiveness is the defense’s crippling burden of proving materiality. Under Brady, 
the defense must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result would 
have been different had the evidence been disclosed. We have already addressed the 
problem of imposing an outcome-determinative test as a standard for judging a 
pretrial disclosure decision. Assuming, however, that suppressed evidence does not 
surface until after a conviction, how should appellate courts evaluate the fairness of 
the resulting conviction?
 The proposed statute would shift the burden of proving prejudice to the 
prosecution in some cases, where it rests with respect to all other constitutional 
violations.188 Specifically, with respect to the items required to be disclosed on 
Checklist A,189 the disclosability of which the prosecution would have notice, the 
prosecution would be required to show that nondisclosure was not material. With 
respect to other items not required by Checklist A, the defense would continue to 
bear the burden of proving materiality.
 This modification of the prejudice requirement is supported by, albeit an extension 
of, existing Supreme Court doctrine. As long ago as its decision in United States v. 
186. See Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1107–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing timeliness issue and 
reversing based on delayed disclosure); United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001).
187. See infra Appendix B.
188. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For a list of constitutional errors that have been 
subjected to the constitutional harmless error standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991).
189. See infra Appendix C. 
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Agurs, the Court explicitly stated that “when the prosecutor receives a specific and 
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.”190 
The checklist is a “request-equivalent.” For the same reasons that a specific discovery 
request heightens the prosecutor’s burden, so should the checklist. Like a specific 
request, the checklist makes the prosecution’s compliance much easier: it tells the 
prosecutor precisely what to look for, rather than requiring her to comb through her 
files and figure out on her own what might be disclosable. Like the request, because 
most prosecutors who do not know what the defense’s strategy is, the checklist puts 
the prosecutor on notice that certain information is important to the defense, so it is 
fair to require the prosecution to prove that nondisclosure was harmless. Finally, as 
the government suggested in Bagley, a more lenient materiality standard in a case 
involving a specific defense request is appropriate because
an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of 
certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the 
evidence does not exist. In reliance on this misleading representation, the 
defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial 
strategies that it otherwise would have pursued.191
 These factors argue in favor of a more lenient standard where material requested 
in the checklist is not disclosed. By the same token, as to favorable information that 
has not been requested or listed on Checklist A,192 the burden of proving materiality 
should remain on the defense.
 F. Defense Disclosure
 The proposed statute does not reciprocally expand the defense’s disclosure 
obligations. That is, beyond what already exists in state and federal statutes, there is 
no requirement that the defense reveal its theory of defense or its witnesses, or 
otherwise share information with the prosecution. This is unlike the regime in the 
United Kingdom, where the defense has an obligation to file a defense statement that 
identifies the defense’s theory and the ways in which the defense takes issue with the 
prosecution’s contentions. In response, the prosecution must disclose any helpful 
information that has not already been disclosed. Of course, the already existing U.S. 
defense disclosure obligations concerning alibi and similar ambush-type defenses 
will remain in place.
 The statute does not expand the defense’s obligation because defense disclosure 
has virtually no role to play in protecting the innocent and very little to do with 
Brady’s fundamental fairness concerns. Brady was intended to level the playing field 
by requiring that the prosecution reveal the results of its superior investigative 
resources to the defense. While it is possible that defense disclosure will assist the 
190. 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67 (1990) (articulating a higher standard of 
materiality for specifically requested evidence under the New York State Constitution).
191. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
192. See infra Appendix C.
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prosecutors in doing so, the case law reveals that the exculpatory nature of information 
routinely withheld by prosecutors is obvious, with or without any disclosure by the 
defense. However, since this symposium’s proposed alternative process involves 
increased disclosure obligations by the defense, one option would be to permit the 
filing of a defense statement that would then broaden the prosecution’s disclosure 
obligation in response. As in the United Kingdom, disclosure by the defense could 
broaden the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation, but it is not a prerequisite to it. And, 
as in the United Kingdom, once the defense statement is filed, the failure to disclose 
information helpful to that defense would almost invariably require reversal.
V. CONCLUSION
 The common law development of the Brady doctrine has not been successful in 
protecting a defendant’s right to fundamental fairness, and case law demonstrates 
that it certainly has not resulted in meaningful protection for the innocent. It is time 
to acknowledge what we already know about the relationship between wrongful 
convictions and the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Professional consensus 
supports the codification of specific disclosure rules and requirements, such as those 
set forth in the appendices attached: a broader disclosure obligation with no regard 
to materiality, specific disclosure checklists and compliance protocols, a modified 
materiality showing, and clearer and more effective time limits. At this stage of 
scholarly, judicial, and professional awareness and development, a failure to design 
and enforce such a clear and effective disclosure regime amounts to willful blindness, 
and will perpetuate the current lack of faith in the morality of the criminal process 
and its ability to protect the innocent.
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APPENDIX A
UNUSED MATERIAL THAT MAY BE CREATED OR USED DURING 
AN INVESTIGATION
Crime Reporting and Suspect Identification Administration
Form MG6C
999 voice tape
Exhibits not referred to in 
statements
Post arrest photographs
Details of other suspects 
arrested, interviewed, 
or questioned but not 
charged
Audio/video tapes of 
interviews of witnesses
Potential witnesses’details 
where no MG11 given
CCTV or other videos
Media releases by police
Fingerprint forms
Witness album 
documentation
ID procedure forms 
(except participant 
lists)
Crime reports
Incident log of messages 
Pocket books
Custody records
Letter of complaint of 
crime
First description of all 
suspects however and 
wherever recorded
Material in police 
possession from third 
party
Plans or video of crime 
scene
Details of whether any 
witness has sought or 
received a reward+
Form MG6D
CHIS report
Offender profiles
Port warnings 
Wanted/missing 
circulations
Crimestoppers 
Force intelligence bureau 
material 
Sensitive material in 
police possession from 
Social Services or local 
authority
Form MG6B
Police misconduct 
material (disciplinary 
findings/convictions, 
etc.)
Form MG6C
Road traffic crash reports
Vulnerable victim or 
witness profile
Message Switching 
System messages+
Record of property 
recovered from crime 
scenes
Record of searches
Custody record
Post charge photograph
Lay visitors report
Holmes actions, messages 
and docs+
Family liaison logs+
Property recovered from 
crime scenes forms+
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Investigation Forensic and Medical 
Records
Third party
Form MG6C
Scientific or SOCO 
findings not used as 
evidence
Draft statements or 
preparatory notes
DNA or other forensic 
material not used as 
evidence
MG11s from unwilling or 
unhelpful witnesses
Prompt notes for 
interviews
Medical Examiner reports 
for suspect or witnesses
Records of information 
provided, e.g., in 
conversation
House to house 
enquiries+
Audiotape or written note 
of interview with 
witnesses notified by 
the accused
Form MG6D
Operational briefing/
debriefing sheets 
Policy files
Information in support of 
search or arrest 
warrants
RIPA authorities/
documentation
Observations/surveillance 
logs
Form MG6C
SOCO/IDO work sheets
File records
Pathologists’ records
Dental records
Forensic scientist’s records 
lab forms
Hospital records relating 
to the condition which 
is the subject of the 
offence charged+
Form MG6
Medical and dental 
records
Media material
Special procedure 
applications
Records held by other 
agencies
Form MG6D
Records/material held by 
Social Services or local 
authority
+Enter on MG6C unless would reveal sensitive material in which case list on MG6D or consider editing.
Edit sensitive entries from copies to be disclosed to defence, e.g., address telephone numbers.
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APPENDIX B – MODEL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
The following provisions supplement existing disclosure obligations of the police and 
prosecution.
I. Required Disclosure
 Within fourteen days of a defendant’s request, and subject only to the public 
interest immunity exception set forth in Part III, below, the prosecutor shall make 
the following disclosure to the defense and to the court:
 A.  Any and all information that might reasonably be helpful to the defense, in 
any form, that tends to (a) exculpate the defendant; (b) adversely impact the 
credibility of government witnesses or evidence; (c) mitigate the offense; or 
(d) mitigate punishment.
 B. Checklist A, as indicated.
 C.  Such disclosure shall be accompanied by a written certification that the 
prosecutor has exercised due diligence in locating all information favorable to 
the defendant, that the prosecutor has disclosed such information, and that 
the prosecutor acknowledges his continuing obligation to disclose such 
information immediately upon such information becoming known.
 D.  If the prosecutor reasonably believes that the disclosure of certain information 
will lead to the destruction of evidence or harm to any individual, that 
information should be listed on a separate Checklist, titled Checklist B.
II. Failure to Disclose Listed Information
 Where information of the type listed on Checklist A is not revealed to the 
defense but is discovered and forms the basis of a defense request for post-conviction 
relief, the prosecution shall be required to prove that the failure to disclose that 
information was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Where information not 
required to be disclosed on Checklist A is not revealed to the defense but is discovered 
and forms the basis of a defense request for post-conviction relief, the defendant shall 
be required to prove that the failure to disclose was material. As used in this statute, 
“material” means there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been 
different had the information been disclosed.
III. Public Interest Immunity
 An application may be made to the court for a protective order where the 
prosecutor can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that disclosure of the 
information set forth in Section II, above, will result in:
 (1) physical injury to any individual; 
 (2) the destruction or disappearance of relevant evidence; or
 (3) irreparable damage to an ongoing investigation.
IV. Sanctions
Failure to comply with any of the obligations set forth in this statute may result in 
dismissal, preclusion, default, or the imposition of other sanctions as deemed 
appropriate by the court.
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APPENDIX C
CHECKLIST A: REQUIRED DISCLOSURE
As to Witnesses, generally
Relationship to defendant
Past criminal record
Prison records
Suspected criminal activity
Prior inconsistent statements
Prior conduct that suggests a motive to lie
Promises of leniency, written or unwritten
Reasonable expectations of leniency
Written agreements
Any of the witnesses originally suspects?
Reward offered?
Identification Witnesses
Any witness who identified the defendant?
What form of identification procedure?
Any previous descriptions?
Any witness who failed to identify the defendant?
Any witness who identified someone [other than the defendant]?
Any witness who expressed uncertainty in identifying the defendant?
Any witness who changed his or her mind about identification?
Forensic
Was a weapon recovered?
Any forensic testing?
Were the results conclusive?
Medical evidence?
Psychiatric reports
Informant
Tips
Promises of immunity
Prior criminal records
Prior inconsistent statements
Information about mental or physical impairment
Inconsistent or contradictory scientific tests
Pending charges
Monetary inducements
Proffers
Failure to institute civil proceedings
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Statements of eyewitnesses
Any and all statements of identifying witnesses
Any information relating to identification of other suspects
Prior inconsistent statements
